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Abstract This paper is concerned with a new type of differential game problems of forward-
backward stochastic systems. There are three distinguishing features: Firstly, our game systems
are forward-backward doubly stochastic differential equations, which is a class of more general
game systems than other forward-backward stochastic game systems without doubly stochastic
terms; Secondly, forward equations are directly related to backward equations at initial time,
not terminal time; Thirdly, the admissible control is required to be adapted to a sub-information
of the full information generated by the underlying Brownian motions. We give a necessary and
a sufficient conditions for both an equilibrium point of nonzero-sum games and a saddle point of
zero-sum games. Finally, we work out an example of linear-quadratic nonzero-sum differential
games to illustrate the theoretical applications. Applying some stochastic filtering techniques,
we obtain the explicit expression of the equilibrium point.
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1 Introduction
Game theory is a useful tool which helps us understand economic, social, political, and bio-
logical phenomena. Stochastic differential game problems also attract more and more research
attentions, and are used widely in other social and behavioral sciences. When we study stochas-
tic differential games of backward doubly stochastic differential equations (BDSDEs, for short),
doubly stochastic Hamiltonian systems with boundary conditions appear naturally whose dy-
namics are described by initial coupled forward-backward doubly stochastic differential equations
(FBDSDEs, for short). To illustrate this, we introduce an example of linear quadratic (LQ, for
short) nonzero-sum differential games of BDSDEs with partial information which motivates us
to initiate a study of stochastic differential games of initial coupled FBDSDEs with partial
information. We now explain this in more detail.
Let T be a fixed constant and
(
Ω,F , P
)
be a complete filtered probability space, on which
two mutually independent standard Brownian motions B(·) ∈ Rl and W (·) ∈ Rd are defined.
Let N denote the class of P -null sets of F . For each t ∈ [0, T ], we define
Ft
.
= FWt ∨ F
B
t,T ,
where FWt = N ∨σ{W (r)−W (0) : 0 ≤ r ≤ t} and F
B
t,T = N ∨σ{B(r)−B(t) : t ≤ r ≤ T}. Note
that the set Ft, t ∈ [0, T ] is neither increasing nor decreasing, so it does not constitute a filtration.
We denote by LpT (Ω;S) all class of FT -measurable random variables {ξ : Ω −→ S} satisfying
E|ξ|p <∞, by LpFt(0, T ;S) all class of Ft-adapted stochastic processes {x(t) : [0, T ]×Ω −→ S}
satisfying E
[ ∫ T
0 |x(t)|
pdt
]
< +∞. If there is no risk of confusion, we write LpT = L
p
T (Ω;S),
LpFt = L
p
Ft
(0, T ;S). The processes v1(t) = v1(t, ω) and v2(t) = v2(t, ω) are our open-loop control
processes. Let Ui be a nonempty convex subset of R
ki ( i = 1, 2). In many cases in which the
full information Ft is inaccessible for players, ones can only observe a partial information. For
this, we denote the set of all open-loop admissible controls for the player i by
Ui =
{
vi(·) : [0, T ] × Ω −→ Ui
∣∣vi(·) is Et-adapted and satisfies E
∫ T
0
|vi(t)|
2dt <∞
}
,
where i = 1, 2, Et is an available sub-information of full information Ft for players, i.e.
Et ⊆ Ft, for all t.
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For example, Et could be the δ-delayed information defined by
Et = F(t−δ)+ ,
where δ is a given positive constant delay. Each element of Ui is called an admissible control for
Player i on [0, T] (i = 1, 2). U1 × U2 is called the set of open-loop admissible controls for the
players.
We consider the following 1-dimensional linear BDSDE

−dY (t) =[A1Y (t) +B1Z(t) + C1v1(t) +D1v2(t)]dt
+ [A2Y (t) +B2Z(t) + C2v1(t) +D2v2(t)]dˆB(t)− Z(t)dW (t),
Y (T ) =ξ,
(1)
and the performance criterion, for i = 1, 2,
Ji(v1(·), v2(·)) =−
1
2
E
{
〈Fi1Y (0), Y (0)〉+
∫ T
0
[
〈Fi2Y (t), Y (t)〉
+ 〈Fi3Z(t), Z(t)〉+ 〈Fi4v1(t), v1(t)〉 + 〈Fi5v2(t), v2(t)〉
]
dt
}
,
(2)
where the integral with respect to dˆB(t) is a ”backward Itoˆ integral” and the integral with
respect to dW (t) is a standard forward Itoˆ integral. These are two types of particular cases
of the Itoˆ-Skorohod integral (see Nualart and Pardoux[13]). The extra noise {B(t)} can be
considered some extra information that can not be detected in practice, such as in a derivative
security market, but is valuable to the partial investors.
If we let A2, B2, C2,D2 ≡ 0, then equation (1) is reduced to a general backward stochastic
differential equation (BSDE, for short) of Pardoux-Peng’s type (see Pardoux and Peng[16]).
For simplicity, we assume temporarily that ξ ∈ L2T (Ω,R
1), all coefficients in (1) and (2) are
1-dimensional, l = d = 1, Fi1, Fi2, Fi3 ≥ 0, Fi4, Fi5 > 0.
Our aim is to seek an equilibrium point (u1(·), u2(·)) ∈ U1×U2, for all (v1(·), v2(·)) ∈ U1×U2,
such that 

J(u1(·), u2(·)) ≥ J(v1(·), u2(·)),
J(u1(·), u2(·)) ≥ J(u1(·), v2(·)).
We call it an LQ nonzero-sum differential game of BDSDE and denote it by Problem (LQNZB).
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Applying Theorem 4.1 in Han et al.[4], we conclude that the equilibrium point must satisfy
the following form: 

u1(t) = −E
[
F−114
(
C1y1(t) + C2z1(t)
)∣∣Et],
u2(t) = E
[
F−125
(
D1y2(t) +D2z2(t)
)∣∣Et], (3)
where (yi, zi) (i = 1, 2) is the solution of the following initial coupled FBDSDE:

−dY (t) =
[
A1Y (t) +B1Z(t)− C1F
−1
14
(
C1y1(t) + C2z1(t)
)
−D1F
−1
25
(
D1y2(t) +D2z2(t)
)]
dt
+
[
A2Y (t) +B2Z(t)− C2F
−1
14
(
C1y1(t) +C2z1(t)
)
−D2F
−1
25
(
D1y2(t) +D2z2(t)
)
dˆB(t)− Z(t)dW (t),
dyi(t) =
(
A1yi(t) +A2zi(t) + Fi2Y (t)
)
dt+
(
B1yi(t) +B2zi(t) + Fi3Z(t)
)
dW (t)
− zi(t)dˆB(t),
Y (T ) =ξ, yi(0) = Fi1Y (0).
(4)
We see that the equation for Y (·) is backward (since it is given the final datum which is an
FT -measurable random variable), the equation for yi(·) is forward (since it is given the initial
datum which is directly related with the backward solution Y (·) at initial time). Further, the
backward equation is “forward” with respect to the backward stochastic integral dˆB(t), as well as
“backward” with respect to the forward stochastic integral dW (t); the coupled forward equation
is “backward” with respect to the backward stochastic integral dˆB(t), as well as “forward”
with respect to the forward stochastic integral dW (t). Equation (4) is exactly the type of time-
symmetric forward-backward stochastic differential equations (FBSDEs, for short) introduced
by Peng and Shi[19]. There is a small difference between equation (4) and FBSDE in Peng and
Shi[19]: the former is initial coupled, but the latter is terminal coupled. So we call equation
(4) an initial coupled linear FBDSDE. In addition, the candidate equilibrium point denoted by
(3) involves the available sub-information Et of full information Ft for players. Thus, a type of
initial coupled FBDSDE naturally appears when we study Problem (LQNZB). Since this type
of FBDSDEs possess fine dynamics and can be reduced to FBSDEs or BDSDEs or BSDEs, one
could not help thinking about differential game problems for initial coupled FBDSDEs under
partial information.
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Pardoux[15] generalized the classical Feynman-Kac formula and provided a probabilistic
representation for solutions of linear parabolic stochastic partial differential equations (SPDEs,
for short). By introducing originally BDSDEs, which is a new class of BSDEs and covers the
results of Pardoux and Peng[16], Pardoux and Peng[17] produced a probabilistic representation
of certain quasi-linear SPDEs as an extension to the Feynman-Kac formula for linear SPDEs.
In general, that a forward SDE of Itoˆ’s type couples a backward SDE of Pardoux-Peng’s type,
which maybe couple each other at initial conditions or terminal conditions, constitutes an initial
or terminal coupled FBSDE. The theory of FBSDEs has received considerable research attention
in recent years. For more information on the solvability of FBSDEs and corresponding optimal
control problems with full or partial information, see e.g. Antonelli[1], Hu and Peng[5], Ma,
Protter and Yong[9], Meng[11], Øksendal and Sulem[14], Peng and Shi[18], Peng and Wu[20],
Shi and Wu[21, 22], Wang and Wu[23, 24], Wu[27, 28], specially the monographs by Ma and
Yong[10] and Yong and Zhou[32], etc.
There is a few literature on differential games of BSDEs and FBSDEs. Yu and Ji[34] ob-
tained an existence and uniqueness result for an initial coupled FBSDE under some monotone
conditions, applied it to backward linear-quadratic nonzero-sum stochastic differential game
problem and got the explicit form of a Nash equilibrium point. Wang and Yu[25] established a
necessary and a sufficient conditions for an equilibrium point of nonzero-sum differential game
of BSDEs and applied them to study a financial problem. Zhang[35] extended the result of Yu
and Ji[34] to the case where BSDEs are driven by both Brownian motion and Poisson random
measure. Wang and Yu[26] recently generalize the results of [25] to partial information differen-
tial games and obtain the corresponding maximum principle and verification theorem, and they
also apply the theoretical results to study LQ differential games and financial problem. Yu[33]
mainly studied the LQ optimal control and nonzero-sum differential game of FBSDE. Hui and
Xiao[7] investigated differential games of FBSDEs, and established the maximum principle and
verification theorem for both an equilibrium point of nonzero-sum cases and a saddle point of
zero-sum cases. Meng[12] discussed the partial information zero-sum differential games of fully
coupled FBSDEs.
Han et al.[4] investigated the optimal control for BDSDEs and obtain a stochastic maximum
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principle of the optimal control. In [19], Peng and Shi established the existence and uniqueness
results of terminal coupled FBDSDEs under certain monotonicity assumptions. Zhu et al.[37]
relaxed the monotonicity assumptions and allowed the case of different dimensions between
forward equations and backward equations, compared with the results in Peng and Shi[19].
Zhang and Shi[36] studied the optimal control of fully terminal-coupled FBDSDEs and obtained
the maximum principle in the global form, where the control variables can enter into the diffusion
coefficients and the control domain need not be convex. Using the solution of FBDSDEs, Zhang
and Shi also got the explicit form of open-loop Nash equilibrium point for nonzero-sum stochastic
differential games of only forward doubly stochastic differential equations.
However, none of the works mentioned above deals with differential games of initial coupled
FBDSDEs with full information or partial information. In Section 2, we formulate the zero-sum
and nonzero-sum games of initial-coupled FBDSDEs with partial information. In Section 3, we
are devoted to proving a maximum principle and a verification theorem for both an equilibrium
point of nonzero-sum games and a saddle point of zero-sum games. In Section 4, an example of
a nonzero-sum differential game is worked out to illustrate theoretical applications. In terms of
maximum principle and verification theorem, the explicit expression of an equilibrium point is
obtained. Finally, we give some concluding remarks.
2 Formulation of the problem
We introduce the mappings
f : [0, T ] ×Rn ×Rn×l × Rm × Rm×d × U1 × U2 → R
n,
f¯ : [0, T ] ×Rn ×Rn×l × Rm × Rm×d × U1 × U2 → R
n×d,
g : [0, T ]× Rm ×Rm×d × U1 × U2 → R
m,
g¯ : [0, T ]× Rm ×Rm×d × U1 × U2 → R
m×l,
φ : Rm → Rn, ϕ, ϕi : R
m → R1, γ, γi : R
n → R1,
l, li : [0, T ]× R
n × Rn×l × Rm × Rm×d × U1 × U2 → R
1 (i = 1, 2).
Assumption (H1): For any (y, z, Y, Z, v1, v2) ∈ R
n × Rn×l × Rm × Rm×d × U1 × U2, we assume
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that
f(·, y, z, Y, Z, v1, v2) ∈ L
2
Ft(0, T ;R
n), f¯(·, y, z, Y, Z, v1, v2) ∈ L
2
Ft(0, T ;R
n×d),
g(·, Y, Z, v1, v2) ∈ L
2
Ft
(0, T ;Rm), g¯(·, Y, Z, v1, v2) ∈ L
2
Ft
(0, T ;Rm×l).
We assume moreover that f, f¯ , g and g¯ are continuously differentiable with respect to (y, z, Y, Z,
v1, v2) and their derivatives with respect to (y, z, Y, Z, v1, v2) are continuous and uniformly
bounded. l, l1, l2, ϕ, ϕ1, ϕ2, γ, γ1 and γ2 are continuously differential with respect to (y, z, Y, Z, v1,
v2) and their derivatives with respect to (y, z, Y, Z, v1, v2) are continuous and bounded by
K(1 + |y| + |z| + |Y | + |Z| + |v1| + |v2|). There exists constants k > 0 and 0 < c < 1 such
that
|f¯(t, y1, z1, Y1, Z1, u1, u2)− f¯(t, y2, z2, Y2, Z2, v1, v2)|
2
≤k(|y1 − y2|
2 + |Y1 − Y2|
2 + |Z1 − Z2|
2 + |u1 − v1|
2 + |u2 − v2|
2) + c|z1 − z2|
2,
|g¯(t, Y1, Z1, u1, u2)− g¯(t, Y2, Z2, v1, v2)|
2
≤k(|Y1 − Y2|
2 + |u1 − v1|
2 + |u2 − v2|
2) + c|Z1 − Z2|
2),
for all (y1, z1, Y1, Z1, u1, u2), (y2, z2, Y2, Z2, v1, v2) ∈ R
n × Rn×l × Rm × Rm×d × U1 × U2.
In the following, we specify the problems of nonzero-sum and zero-sum differential games of
forward-backward doubly stochastic systems, respectively. For simplicity, we denote them by
Problem (NZSG) and Problem (ZSG), respectively.
Consider an FBDSDE

−dY v1,v2(t) = g(t, Y v1,v2(t), Zv1,v2(t), v1(t), v2(t))dt
+ g¯(t, Y v1,v2(t), Zv1,v2(t), v1(t), v2(t))dˆB(t)− Z
v1,v2(t)dW (t),
dyv1,v2(t) = f(t, yv1,v2(t), zv1,v2(t), Y v1,v2(t), Zv1,v2(t), v1(t), v2(t))dt
+ f¯(t, yv1,v2(t), zv1,v2(t), Y v1,v2(t), Zv1,v2(t), v1(t), v2(t))dW (t)
− zv1,v2(t)dˆB(t),
Y v1,v2(T ) = ξ, yv1,v2(0) = φ(Y v1,v2(0)), 0 ≤ t ≤ T.
(5)
Under the assumption (H1), there exists a unique solution
(
yv1,v2(·), zv1 ,v2(·), Y v1,v2(·), Zv1,v2(·)
)
∈
L2Ft(0, T ; R
n)×L2Ft(0, T ; R
n×l)×L2Ft(0, T ; R
m)×L2Ft(0, T ; R
m×d) to equation (5) for any (v1(·), v2(·))
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∈ U1×U2 (see Pardoux and Peng[17]). In the case where equation (5) does not involve the term
of backward Itoˆ’s integral, i.e. g¯ ≡ 0, f and f¯ are independent of zv1,v2 , the game systems will
be reduced to the initial coupled FBSDEs which has been studied by Xiao and Wang[30]. In
the case where equation (5) does not involve the forward equation, i.e. f = f¯ = φ ≡ 0, the
game systems will be reduced to the BDSDEs which has been investigated by Han et al.[4]. In
the case where equation (5) does not involve both the term of backward Itoˆ’s integral and the
forward equation, the game systems will be reduced to the BSDEs which has been investigated
by Wang and Yu[25, 26] and Yu and Ji[34].
Consider a performance criterion
Ji(v1(·), v2(·)) = E
[ ∫ T
0
li
(
t, yv1,v2(t), zv1,v2(t), Y v1,v2(t), Zv1,v2(t), v1(t), v2(t)
)
dt
+ ϕi(Y
v1,v2(0))
]
+ γi(y
v1,v2(T )) (6)
with li(·, y
v1,v2(·), zv1 ,v2(·), Y v1,v2(·), Zv1,v2(·), v1(·), v2(·)) ∈ L
1
Ft
(0, T ; R) and ϕi ∈ L
1 (0, T ; R)
for any (v1(·), v2(·)) ∈ U1 × U2 (i = 1, 2), and
J(v1(·), v2(·)) = E
[ ∫ T
0
l
(
t, yv1,v2(t), zv1,v2(t), Y v1,v2(t), Zv1,v2(t), v1(t), v2(t)
)
dt
+ ϕ(yv1,v2(T ))
]
+ γ(Y v1,v2(0)) (7)
with l(·, yv1,v2(·), Y v1,v2(·), Zv1,v2(·), v1(·), v2(·)) ∈ L
1
Ft
(0, T ; R) and ϕ ∈ L1 (0, T ; R) for any
(v1(·), v2(·)) ∈ U1 × U2. We note that (6) and (7) are well posed. There are two players i1 and
i2. Player i1 controls v1 and Player i2 controls v2.
Problem (NZSG): Find (u1(·), u2(·)) ∈ U1 × U2 such that

J1(u1(·), u2(·)) ≥ J1(v1(·), u2(·)),
J2(u1(·), u2(·)) ≥ J2(u1(·), v2(·)),
(8)
for all (v1(·), v2(·)) ∈ U1 × U2. We call (u1(·), u2(·)) an open-loop equilibrium point of Problem
(NZSG) (if it does exist). It is easy to see that the existence of an open-loop equilibrium point
implies 

J1(u1(·), u2(·)) = sup
v1(·)∈U1
J1(v1(·), u2(·)),
J2(u1(·), u2(·)) = sup
v2(·)∈U2
J2(u1(·), v2(·)).
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Problem (ZSG): Find (u1(·), u2(·)) ∈ U1 × U2 such that
J(u1(·), v2(·)) ≤ J(u1(·), u2(·)) ≤ J(v1(·), u2(·)), (9)
for all (v1(·), v2(·)) ∈ U1×U2. We call (u1(·), u2(·)) an open-loop saddle point of Problem (ZSG)
(if it exists). In fact the existence of an open-loop saddle point implies
J(u1(·), u2(·)) = sup
v2(·)∈U2
(
inf
v1(·)∈U1
J
(
v1(·), v2(·)
))
= inf
v1(·)∈U1
(
sup
v2(·)∈U2
J
(
v1(·), v2(·)
))
.
We shall verify this point in Theorem 3.5 (iii).
3 Differential games of FBDSDEs
3.1 Nonzero-sum case
Suppose (u1(·), u2(·)) is an equilibrium point of Problem (NZSG) with the trajectory
(
y(·),
z(·), Y (·), Z(·)
)
of (5). For all t ∈ [0, T ], let vi(t) ∈ Ui be such that ui(·) + vi(·) ∈ Ui (i = 1, 2).
Notice that Ui is convex, then for 0 ≤ ǫ, ρ ≤ 1, i = 1, 2,
u1ǫ(t) = u1(t) + ǫv1(t) ∈ U1, u2ρ(t) = u2(t) + ρv2(t) ∈ U2, 0 ≤ t ≤ T.
For simplicity, we denote
f(t) = f
(
t, y(t), z(t), Y (t), Z(t), u1(t), u2(t)
)
,
g(t) = g
(
t, Y (t), Z(t), u1(t), u2(t)
)
,
Y u1ǫ(t) = Y (u1+ǫv1,u2)(t), Y u2ρ(t) = Y (u1,u2+ρv2)(t),
hi(ǫ, ρ) = Ji(u1 + ǫv1, u2 + ρv2),
define the processes
Yˆ 1(t) =
d
dǫ
Y u1ǫ(t)|ǫ=0, Yˆ
2(t) =
d
dρ
Y u2ρ(t)|ρ=0,
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and make the similar notations for f¯ , g¯, li, yˆ
i, zˆi, Zˆi, i = 1, 2. For i = 1, 2, we have the following
variational equations: 

−dYˆ i(t) =gˆi(t)dt+ ˆ¯gi(t)dˆB(t)− Zˆi(t)dW (t),
dyˆi(t) =fˆ i(t)dt+ ˆ¯f i(t)dW (t)− zˆi(t)dˆB(t),
Yˆ i(T ) =0, yˆi(0) = φY (Y (0))Yˆ
i(0)
where
gˆi(t) =gY (t)Yˆ
i(t) + gZ(t)Zˆ
i(t) + gvi(t)vi(t),
ˆ¯gi(t) =g¯Y (t)Yˆ
i(t) + g¯Z(t)Zˆ
i(t) + g¯vi(t)vi(t),
fˆ i(t) =fy(t)yˆ
i(t) + fz(t)zˆ
i(t) + fY (t)Yˆ
i(t) + fZ(t)Zˆ
i(t) + fvi(t)vi(t),
ˆ¯f i(t) =f¯y(t)yˆ
i(t) + f¯z(t)zˆ
i(t) + f¯Y (t)Yˆ
i(t) + f¯Z(t)Zˆ
i(t) + f¯vi(t)vi(t),
lˆi(t) =liy(t)yˆ
i(t) + liz(t)zˆ
i(t) + liY (t)Yˆ
i(t) + liZ(t)Zˆ
i(t) + livi(t)vi(t).
Next, we define the generalized Hamiltonian function Hi : [0, T ] × R
n × Rn×l × Rm × Rm×d ×
U1 ×U2 × R
n × Rn×l ×Rm × Rm×d as follows:
Hi(t, y, z,Y, Z, v1, v2, pi, p¯i, qi, q¯i) , 〈qi, f(y, z, Y, Z, v1, v2)〉+ 〈q¯i, f¯(y, z, Y, Z, v1, v2)〉
− 〈pi, g(Y,Z, v1, v2)〉 − 〈p¯i, g¯(Y,Z, v1, v2)〉 + li(y, z, Y, Z, v1, v2). (10)
Let (u1, u2) ∈ U1 × U2 with the solution
(
y(·), z(·), Y (·), Z(·)
)
of equation (5). We shall use the
abbreviated notation Hi(t) defined by
Hi(t) ≡ Hi
(
t, y(t), z(t), Y (t), Z(t), u1(t), u2(t), pi(t), p¯i(t), qi(t), q¯i(t)
)
.
The adjoint equations are described by the following generalized stochastic Hamiltonian systems:

dpi(t) =−H
∗
iY (t)dt−H
∗
iZ(t)dW (t) − p¯i(t)dˆB(t),
−dqi(t) = H
∗
iy(t)dt+H
∗
iz(t)dˆB(t)− q¯i(t)dW (t),
pi(0) =− ϕ
∗
iY (Y (0))− φ
∗
Y
(
Y (0)
)
qi(0),
qi(T ) =γ
∗
iy
(
y(T )
)
.
(11)
Then we have the following maximum principle for nonzero-sum differential games.
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Theorem 3.1 (Maximum principle for nonzero-sum games) Let (H1) hold and
(
u1(·),
u2(·)
)
be an equilibrium point of Problem (NZSG) with the corresponding solutions
(
x(·), y(·),
z(·)
)
and
(
pi(·), qi(·), ki(·)
)
of (5) and (11). Then it follows that
〈
E[H∗1v1(t)|Et], v1(t)− u1(t)
〉
≤ 0 (12)
and 〈
E[H∗2v2(t)|Et], v2(t)− u2(t)
〉
≤ 0 (13)
are true for any (v1(·), v2(·)) ∈ U1 × U2, a.e. a.s.
Proof: Since (u1(·), u2(·)) is an equilibrium point, we have
∂h1
∂ǫ
(0, 0) = lim
ǫ→0
J1(u1 + ǫv1, u2)− J1(u1, u2)
ǫ
≤ 0.
Then
0 ≥
∂
∂ǫ
h1(ǫ, 0)|ǫ=0
=E
∫ T
0
(
l1y(t)yˆ
1(t) + l1z(t)zˆ
1(t) + l1Y (t)Yˆ
1(t) + l1Z(t)Zˆ
1(t) + l1v1(t)v1(t)
)
dt
+ E
(
ϕ1Y
(
Y (0)
)
Yˆ 1(0) + γ1y
(
y(T )
)
yˆ1(T )
)
. (14)
Applying Itoˆ’s formula to 〈p1(t), Yˆ
1(t)〉 and 〈q1(t), yˆ
1(t)〉, and integrating from 0 to T , we have
E
(
ϕ1Y
(
Y (0)
)
Yˆ 1(0)
)
=− E〈p1(0) + φ
∗
Y (Y (0))q1(0), Yˆ
1(0)〉 = −〈φ∗Y (Y (0))q1(0), Yˆ
1(0)〉
− E
∫ T
0
(
p∗1(t)gv1(t)v1(t) + q
∗
1(t)fY (t)Yˆ
1(t) + q¯∗1(t)f¯Y (t)Yˆ
1(t)− l1Y (t)Yˆ
1(t)
+ p¯∗1(t)g¯v1(t)v1(t) + q
∗
1(t)fZ(t)Zˆ
1(t) + q¯∗1(t)f¯Z(t)Zˆ
1(t)− l1Z(t)Zˆ
1(t)
)
dt, (15)
and
E
(
γ1y
(
y(T )
)
yˆ1(T )
)
= 〈φ∗Y (Y (0))q1(0), Yˆ
1(0)〉
+ E
∫ T
0
(
q∗1(t)fY (t)Yˆ
1(t) + q∗1(t)fZ(t)Zˆ
1(t) + q∗1(t)fv1(t)v1(t)− l1y(t)yˆ
1(t)
− l1z(t)zˆ
1(t) + q¯∗1(t)f¯Y (t)Yˆ
1(t) + q¯∗1(t)f¯Z(t)Zˆ
1(t) + q¯∗1(t)f¯v1(t)v1(t)
)
dt. (16)
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Substituting (15) and (16) into (14), for all v1 ∈ U1 such that u1(·) + v1(·) ∈ U1, we get
0 ≥
∂
∂ǫ
h1(ǫ, 0)|ǫ=0
=E
∫ T
0
(
q∗1(t)fv1(t) + q¯
∗
1(t)f¯v1(t) + p
∗
1(t)gv1(t) + p¯
∗
1(t)g¯v1(t) + l1v1(t)
)
v1(t)dt
=E
∫ T
0
〈
H∗1v1(t), v1(t)
〉
dt = E
∫ T
0
E
[〈
H∗1v1(t), v1(t)
〉∣∣∣Et] dt, (17)
which implies that (12) is true. The result (13) can be proved by the same method as shown in
proving (12). 
If the control process
(
v1(·), v2(·)) is admissible adapted to the filtration Ft, we have the
following corollary.
Corollary 3.1 (Maximum principle for full information nonzero-sum games) Suppose
that Et = Ft for all t. Let (H1) hold and
(
u1(·), u2(·)
)
be an equilibrium point of nonzero-sum
differential games with the corresponding solutions
(
x(·), y(·), z(·)
)
and
(
pi(·), qi(·), ki(·)
)
of
(5) and (11). Then it follows that
〈
H∗1v1(t), v1(t)− u1(t)
〉
≤ 0
and 〈
H∗2v2(t), v2(t)− u2(t)
〉
≤ 0
are true for any (v1(·), v2(·)) ∈ U1 × U2, a.e. a.s.
In what follows, we proceed to establish a verification theorem, also called a sufficient con-
dition, for an equilibrium point. For this, we introduce an additional condition as follows:
(H2) φ(Y ) = MY where M is a non-zero constant matrix with order n × m. ϕi and γi are
concave in Y and y (i = 1, 2), respectively.
Theorem 3.2 (Verification theorem for nonzero-sum games) Let (H1) and (H2) hold.
Let (u1(·), u2(·)) ∈ U1 × U2 be with the corresponding solutions (y, z, Y, Z) and (pi, p¯i, qi, q¯i) of
12
equations (5) and (11). Suppose
Hˆ1
(
t, a, b, c, d) = sup
v1∈U1
H1
(
t, a, b, c, d, v1, u2(t), p1(t), p¯1(t), q1(t), q¯1(t)
)
,
Hˆ2
(
t, a, b, c, d) = sup
v2∈U2
H2
(
t, a, b, c, d, u1(t), v2, p2(t), p¯2(t), q2(t), q¯2(t)
)
exist for all (t, a, b, c, d) ∈ [0, T ] × Rn × Rn×l × Rm × Rm×d, and are
concave in (a, b, c, d) for all t ∈ [0, T ] (the Arrow condition).
(18)
Moreover
E
[
H1
(
t, y(t), z(t), Y (t), Z(t), u1(t), u2(t), p1(t), p¯1(t), q1(t), q¯1(t)
)∣∣Et]
= sup
v1∈ U1
E
[
H1
(
t, y(t), z(t), Y (t), Z(t), v1, u2(t), p1(t), q1(t), q¯1(t)
)∣∣Et], (19)
E
[
H2
(
t, y(t), z(t), Y (t), Z(t), u1(t), u2(t), p2(t), p¯2(t), q2(t), q¯2(t)
)∣∣Et]
= sup
v2∈ U2
E
[
H2
(
t, y(t), z(t), Y (t), Z(t), u1(t), v2, p2(t), p¯2(t), q2(t), q¯2(t)
)∣∣Et]. (20)
Then (u1(·), u2(·)) is an equilibrium point of Problem (NZSG).
Proof : Let (v1(·), u2(·)) and (u1(·), v2(·)) ∈ U1 × U2 with the corresponding solutions (y
v1 , zv1 ,
Y v1 , Zv1) and (yv2 , zv2 , Y v2 , Zv2) to equation (5). We define the following terms
H1(t) = H1(t, y(t), z(t), Y (t), Z(t), u1(t), u2(t), p1(t), p¯1(t), q1(t), q¯1(t)),
Hv11 (t) = H1(t, y
v1(t), zv1(t), Y v1(t), Zv1(t), v1(t), u2(t), p1(t), p¯1(t), q1(t), q¯1(t)),
Hv21 (t) = H1(t, y
v2(t), zv2(t), Y v2(t), Zv2(t), u1(t), v2(t), p1(t), p¯1(t), q1(t), q¯1(t)),
f v1(t) = f(t, yv1(t), zv1(t), Y v1(t), Zv1(t), v1(t), u2(t)),
f v2(t) = f(t, yv2 , zv2 , Y v2 , Zv2 , u1(t), v2(t)),
and similar notations are made for f¯ v1 , f¯ v2 , · · · .
By virtue of the concavity property of ϕ1 and γ1, we have for ∀ v1(·) ∈ U1
J1(v1(·), u2(·))− J1(u1(·), u2(·)) ≤ I1 + I2 + I3 (21)
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with
I1 = E [γ1y(y(T ))(y
v1(T )− y(T ))] ,
I2 = E [ϕ1Y (Y (0))(Y
v1(0)− Y (0))] ,
I3 = E
∫ T
0
(
lv11 (t)− l1(t)
)
dt.
Applying Itoˆ’s formula to 〈q1(t), y
v1(t)− y(t)〉 and 〈p1(t), Y
v1(t)− Y (t)〉,
I1 =E[〈q1(0),M(Y
v1(0) − Y (0))〉]
+ E
∫ T
0
(
〈q1(t), f
v1(t)− f(t)〉 − 〈H∗1y(t), y
v1(t)− y(t)〉
+ 〈q¯1(t), f¯
v1(t)− f¯(t)〉 − 〈H∗1z(t), z
v1(t)− z(t)〉
)
dt, (22)
I2 = − E[〈q1(0),M(Y
v1(0) − Y (0))〉]
− E
∫ T
0
(
〈p1(t), g
v1(t)− g(t)〉+ 〈H∗1Y (t), Y
v1(t)− Y (t)〉
+ 〈p¯1(t), g¯
v1(t)− g¯(t)〉+ 〈H∗1Z(t), Z
v1(t)− Z(t)〉
)
dt, (23)
I3 = E
∫ T
0
(
Hv11 (t)−H1(t)− 〈q1(t), f
v1(t)− f(t)〉 − 〈q¯1(t), f¯
v1(t)− f¯(t)〉
+ 〈p¯1(t), g¯
v1(t)− g¯(t)〉+ 〈p1(t), g
v1(t)− g(t)〉
)
dt. (24)
Substituting (22)—(24) into (21), it follows immediately that
J1(v1(·), u2(·)) − J1(u1(·), u2(·))
≤ E
∫ T
0
(
Hv11 (t)−H1(t)− 〈H
∗
1Y (t), Y
v1(t)− Y (t)〉 − 〈H∗1Z(t), Z
v1(t)− Z(t)〉
− 〈H∗1y(t), y
v1(t)− y(t)〉 − 〈H∗1z(t), z
v1(t)− z(t)〉
)
dt. (25)
Since v1 −→ E
[
H1
(
t, y(t), z(t), Y (t), Z(t), v1, u2(t), p1(t), q1(t), q¯1(t)
)∣∣Et] is maximum for v1 =
u1 and since v1(t), u1(t) are Et-measurable, we get
E
[ ∂
∂v1
H1
(
t, y(t), z(t), Y (t), Z(t), u1(t), u2(t), p1(t), p¯1(t), q1(t), q¯1(t)
)(
v1(t)− u1(t)
)∣∣Et]
=E
[ ∂
∂v1
H1
(
t, y(t), z(t), Y (t), Z(t), v1(t), u2(t), p1(t), p¯1(t), q1(t), q¯1(t)
)∣∣Et]
v1=u1
(
v1(t)− u1(t)
)
≤0.
14
By the equality (19) and the concavity of Hˆ1, we conclude that
J1(v1(·), u2(·))− J1(u1(·), u2(·)) ≤ 0, (26)
for all v1(·) ∈ U1. Repeating the similar proceeding as shown in deriving (26), we can prove that
J2(u1(·), v2(·)) − J2(u1(·), u2(·)) ≤ 0. (27)
Based on the arguments above, (u1(·), u2(·)) is an equilibrium point of Problem (NZSG). 
Corollary 3.2 (Verification theorem for full information nonzero-sum games) Suppose
that Et = Ft for all t and that (H1), (H2) and (18) hold. Let (u1(·), u2(·)) ∈ U1×U2 be with the
corresponding solutions (y, z, Y, Z) and (pi, p¯i, qi, q¯i) of equations (5) and (11). Moreover
H1
(
t, y(t), z(t), Y (t), Z(t), u1(t), u2(t), p1(t), p¯1(t), q1(t), q¯1(t)
)
= sup
v1∈ U1
H1
(
t, y(t), z(t), Y (t), Z(t), v1, u2(t), p1(t), q1(t), q¯1(t)
)
H2
(
t, y(t), z(t), Y (t), Z(t), u1(t), u2(t), p2(t), p¯2(t), q2(t), q¯2(t)
)
= sup
v2∈ U2
H2
(
t, y(t), z(t), Y (t), Z(t), u1(t), v2, p2(t), p¯2(t), q2(t), q¯2(t)
)
.
Then (u1(·), u2(·)) is an equilibrium point of nonzero-sum differential games.
3.2 Zero-sum case
In this section, we consider zero-sum differential games of FBDSDEs. In fact, zero-sum games
can be consider a special case of nonzero-sum games. By the maximum principle of nonzero-
sum games in Section 3.1, we can deduce the necessary conditions for a saddle point of zero-sum
games. We shall detail this as follows.
Let
−J1 = J2 = J.
If (u1(·), u2(·)) is an equilibrium point of Problem (NZSG), we have

J1(u1(·), u2(·)) ≥ J1(v1(·), u2(·)),
J2(u1(·), u2(·)) ≥ J2(u1(·), v2(·)),
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which implies that
J(u1(·), v2(·)) ≤ J(u1(·), u2(·)) ≤ J(v1(·), u2(·)).
Therefore, (u1(·), u2(·)) is also a saddle point of Problem (ZSG).
We define a new Hamiltonian function H : [0, T ] × Rn × Rn×l × Rm × Rm×d × U1 × U2 ×
Rn × Rn×l × Rm × Rm×d as follows:
H(t, y, z,Y, Z, v1, v2, p, p¯, q, q¯) , 〈q, f(y, z, Y, Z, v1, v2)〉+ 〈q¯, f¯(y, z, Y, Z, v1, v2)〉
− 〈p, g(Y,Z, v1, v2)〉 − 〈p¯, g¯(Y,Z, v1, v2)〉 + l(y, z, Y, Z, v1, v2). (28)
Let (u1, u2) ∈ U1 × U2 with the solution
(
y(·), z(·), Y (·), Z(·)
)
of equation (5). We shall use the
abbreviated notation H(t) defined by
H(t) ≡ H
(
t, y(t), z(t), Y (t), Z(t), u1(t), u2(t), p(t), p¯(t), q(t), q¯(t)
)
.
The adjoint equations are described by the following generalized stochastic Hamiltonian systems:

dp(t) =−H∗Y (t)dt−H
∗
Z(t)dW (t)− p¯(t)dˆB(t),
−dq(t) = H∗y (t)dt+H
∗
z (t)dˆB(t)− q¯(t)dW (t),
p(0) =− ϕ∗Y (Y (0)) − φ
∗
Y
(
Y (0)
)
q(0),
q(T ) =γ∗y
(
y(T )
)
.
(29)
Based on the above arguments, we can directly derive the following maximum principle for
zero-sum games.
Theorem 3.3 (Maximum principle for zero-sum games) Let (H1) hold and (u1(·), u2(·))
be a saddle point of Problem (ZSG) with the solutions
(
y(·), z(·), Y (·), Z(·)
)
and
(
p(·), p¯(·), q(·),
q¯(·)
)
to (5) and (29), respectively. Then it follows that
〈
E[H∗v1(t)|Et], v1(t)− u1(t)
〉
≥ 0 (30)
and 〈
E[H∗v2(t)|Et], v2(t)− u2(t)
〉
≤ 0 (31)
are true for any (v1(·), v2(·)) ∈ U1 × U2, a.e. a.s.
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Remark 3.1 If
(
u1(·), u2(·)
)
is an equilibrium point (resp. a saddle point) of nonzero-sum
(resp. zero-sum) differential games and
(
u1(t), u2(t)
)
is an interior point of U1 × U2 a.s. for
all t ∈ [0, T ], then the inequalities in Theorem 3.1 (resp. Theorem 3.3) are equivalent to the
following equations
E[H∗ivi(t)|Et] = 0, i = 1, 2
(
resp. E[H∗vj (t)|Et] = 0, j = 1, 2
)
.
We note that Theorem 3.3 gives a globally necessary condition for a saddle point of zero-
sum games. In the following, we begin to present a corresponding locally necessary condition
for Problem (ZSG).
We firstly give the following assumptions.
(H3) For all t, τ such that 0 ≤ t < t+τ ≤ T, all bounded Et-measurable α1, α2, and for s ∈ [0, T ],
the control β1(s)
.
= (0, · · · , β1j(s), · · · , 0) and β2(s)
.
= (0, · · · , β2j(s), · · · , 0), j = 1, · · · , n, with
β1j(s)
.
= α1jχ[t,t+τ ](s) and β2j(s)
.
= α2jχ[t,t+τ ](s)
belong to U1 and U2. For given u1, β1 ∈ U1 and u2, β2 ∈ U2, there exists δ > 0 such that
u1 + ǫβ1 ∈ U1 and u2 + ρβ2 ∈ U1,
where β1 and β2 are bounded, and ǫ, ρ ∈ (−δ, δ).
Theorem 3.4 (Local maximum principle for zero-sum games) Let (H1) and (H3) hold.
Let
(
u1(·), u2(·)
)
∈ U1 × U2 with the solutions
(
y(·), z(·), Y (·), Z(·)
)
and
(
p(·), p¯(·), q(·), q¯(·)
)
to
equations (5) and (29), respectively. Further,
(
u1(·), u2(·)
)
is a directional critical point for
J
(
v1(·), v2(·)
)
, in the sense that, for all bounded β1 ∈ U1 and β2 ∈ U2, there exists δ > 0 such
that u1 + ǫβ1 ∈ U1 and u2 + ρβ2 ∈ U2, and
h(ǫ, ρ)
.
= J(u1 + ǫβ1, u2 + ρβ2)
has a critical point at (0, 0), for all ǫ, ρ ∈ (−δ, δ), i.e.
∂h
∂ǫ
(0, 0) =
∂h
∂ρ
(0, 0) = 0.
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Then, for all t ∈ [0, T ], we have
E[Hv1(t)|Et] = E[Hv2(t)|Et] = 0. (32)
Proof: Since the remaining case can be dealt with by the similar proceeding, we only prove
E[Hv1(t)|Et] = 0.
For ∂h
∂ǫ
(0, 0) = 0, we have
0 =
∂
∂ǫ
h(ǫ, 0)|ǫ=0
=E
∫ T
0
(
ly(t)yˆ
1(t) + lz(t)zˆ
1(t) + lY (t)Yˆ
1(t) + lZ(t)Zˆ
1(t) + lv1(t)β1
)
dt
+ E
(
ϕY
(
Y (0)
)
Yˆ 1(0) + γy
(
y(T )
)
yˆ1(T )
)
. (33)
As shown in Theorem 3.1, applying Itoˆ’s formula to 〈p(t), Yˆ 1(t)〉 and 〈q(t), yˆ1(t)〉, integrating
from 0 to T , and substituting them into (33), we have
0 =
∂
∂ǫ
h(ǫ, 0)|ǫ=0
=E
∫ T
0
(
q∗(t)fv1(t) + q¯
∗(t)f¯v1(t) + p
∗(t)gv1(t) + p¯
∗(t)g¯v1(t) + lv1(t)
)
β1(t)dt
=E
∫ T
0
H∗v1(t)β1(t)dt. (34)
In terms of assumption (H3) and equality (34), we further derive that
E
∫ t+τ
t
Hv1j (s)β1j(s)ds = 0.
Differentiating with respect to τ at τ = 0, it yields that
E[Hv1j (t)β1j(t)] = 0. (35)
Since equality (35) holds for all bounded Et-measurable β1j , we conclude that
E[Hv1(t)|Et] = 0.
Repeating the similar proceeding by differentiating the function h(0, ρ) with respect to ρ, we
have
E[Hv2(t)|Et] = 0.
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The proof is completed. 
In the sequel, we give a verification theorem for a saddle point of zero-sum games.
Theorem 3.5 (Verification theorem for zero-sum games) Let (H1) hold and φ(Y ) =MY
where M is a non-zero constant matrix with order n ×m. Let (u1(·), u2(·)) ∈ U1 × U2 with the
solutions (y, z, Y, Z) and (p, p¯, q, q¯) to equations (5) and (29), respectively. Suppose that the
Hamiltonian function H satisfies the following conditional mini-maximum principle:
E
[
H
(
t, y(t), z(t), Y (t), Z(t), u1(t), u2(t), p(t), p¯(t), q(t), q¯(t)
)∣∣Et]
= inf
v1(·)∈U1
E
[
H(t, y(t), z(t), Y (t), Z(t), v1(t), u2(t), p(t), p¯(t), q(t), q¯(t)
)∣∣Et]
= sup
v2(·)∈U2
E
[
H(t, y(t), z(t), Y (t), Z(t), u1(t), v2(t), p(t), p¯(t), q(t), q¯(t)
)∣∣Et]. (36)
(i)Assume that both ϕ and γ are concave, and
Hˆ2
(
t, a, b, c) = sup
v2(·)∈U2
H
(
t, a, b, c, u1(t), v2, p(t), q(t), k(t)
)
,
exists for all (t, a, b, c) ∈ [0, T ]× Rn × Rm × Rm×d, and is concave in (a, b, c). Then we have
J(u1(·), v2(·)) ≤ J(u1(·), u2(·)), for all v2(·) ∈ U2,
and
J(u1(·), u2(·)) = sup
v2(·)∈U2
J(u1(·), v2(·)).
(ii)Assume that both ϕ and γ are convex, and
Hˆ1
(
t, a, b, c) = inf
v1(·)∈U1
H
(
t, a, b, c, v1, u2(t), p(t), q(t), k(t)
)
,
exists for all (t, a, b, c) ∈ [0, T ]× Rn × Rm × Rm×d, and is convex in (a, b, c). Then we have
J(u1(·), u2(·)) ≤ J(v1(·), u2(·)), for all v1(·) ∈ U1,
and
J(u1(·), u2(·)) = inf
v1(·)∈U1
J(v1(·), u2(·)).
(iii) If both (i) and (ii) are true, then (u1(·), u2(·)) is a saddle point which implies
sup
v2(·)∈U2
(
inf
v1(·)∈U1
J
(
v1(·), v2(·)
))
= J(u1(·), u2(·))
= inf
v1(·)∈U1
(
sup
v2(·)∈U2
J
(
v1(·), v2(·)
))
.
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Proof : (i) Using the same argument as in the proof of Theorem 3.2, we can the following:
J(u1(·), v2(·)) ≤ J(u1(·), u2(·)), for all v2(·) ∈ U2. (37)
Furthermore
sup
v2(·)∈U2
J(u1(·), v2(·)) ≤ J(u1(·), u2(·)).
Since u2(·) ∈ U2, we have
sup
v2(·)∈U2
J(u1(·), v2(·)) = J(u1(·), u2(·)).
(ii) This statement can be proved in a similar way as shown before.
(iii) If both (i) and (ii) are true, then
J(u1(·), v2(·)) ≤ J(u1(·), u2(·)) ≤ J(v1(·), u2(·)),
for all (v1(·), v2(·)) ∈ U1 × U2, i.e. (u1(·), u2(·)) is a saddle point.
In the following, on the one hand, we have
J(u1(·), u2(·)) ≤ inf
v1(·)∈U1
J(v1(·), u2(·)) ≤ inf
v1(·)∈U1
(
sup
v2(·)∈U2
J
(
v1(·)v2(·)
))
,
and
J(u1(·), u2(·)) ≥ sup
v2(·)∈U2
J(u1(·), v2(·)) ≥ sup
v2(·)∈U2
(
inf
v1(·)∈U1
J
(
v1(·), v2(·)
))
,
which imply that
sup
v2(·)∈U2
(
inf
v1(·)∈U1
J
(
v1(·), v2(·)
))
≤ J(u1(·), u2(·))
≤ inf
v1(·)∈U1
(
sup
v2(·)∈U2
J
(
v1(·), v2(·)
))
. (38)
On the other hand, we have
J(u1(·), u2(·)) ≤ inf
v1(·)∈U1
J(v1(·), u2(·)) ≤ sup
v2(·)∈U2
(
inf
v1(·)∈U1
J
(
v1(·), v2(·)
))
and
J(u1(·), u2(·)) ≥ sup
v2(·)∈U2
J(u1(·), v2(·)) ≥ inf
v1(·)∈U1
(
sup
v2(·)∈U2
J
(
v1(·), v2(·)
))
,
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which imply that
sup
v2(·)∈U2
(
inf
v1(·)∈U1
J
(
v1(·), v2(·)
))
≥ J(u1(·), u2(·))
≥ inf
v1(·)∈U1
(
sup
v2(·)∈U2
J
(
v1(·), v2(·)
))
. (39)
Combining (38) and (39), we have
sup
v2(·)∈U2
(
inf
v1(·)∈U1
J
(
v1(·), v2(·)
))
= J(u1(·), u2(·))
= inf
v1(·)∈U1
(
sup
v2(·)∈U2
J
(
v1(·), v2(·)
))
.
Remark 3.2 Similar to the results in Section 3.1, we can also give the corresponding corollaries
for maximum principle and verification theorem of a saddle point of full information zero-sum
differential games. For simplicity, we omit them here.
4 An example on a nonzero-sum game
In this section, an example of nonzero-sum differential games of FBSDEs is worked out to il-
lustrate our theoretical result. Firstly, by applying the maximum principle (see Theorem 3.1),
we find a candidate equilibrium point. Then we obtain the explicit expression of the candidate
equilibrium point by virtue of certain filtering techniques of forward-backward stochastic differ-
ential equations. Finally, using the verification theorem of an equilibrium point (see Theorem
3.2), we confirm that it is indeed an equilibrium point.
Example: Consider the system of FBDSDE

−dY v1,v2(t) =
[
a0(t) + a1(t)Y
v1,v2(t) + a2(t)Z
v1,v2(t) + Fi2(t)v1(t) + a4(t)v2(t)
]
dt
+ b0(t)dˆB(t)− Z
v1,v2(t)dW (t),
dyv1,v2(t) =
[
c0(t) + c1(t)y
v1,v2(t) + c2(t)Y
v1,v2(t) + c3(t)Z
v1,v2(t)
]
dt
+ d0(t)dW (t)− z
v1,v2(t)dˆB(t),
Y v1,v2(T ) = ξ, yv1,v2(0) = MY v1,v2(0),
(40)
21
with the performance criterion, for i = 1, 2,
Ji
(
v1(·), v2(·)
)
= −
1
2
E
[ ∫ T
0
(
〈ei1(t)y
v1,v2(t), yv1,v2(t)〉+ 〈ei2(t)z
v1,v2(t), zv1,v2(t)〉
+ 〈ei3(t)Y
v1,v2(t), Y v1,v2(t)〉+ 〈ei4(t)Z
v1,v2(t), Zv1,v2(t)〉+ 〈ei7(t)vi(t), vi(t)〉
)
dt
+ 〈ei5(T )y
v1,v2(T ), yv1,v2(T )〉+ 〈ei6Y
v1,v2(0), Y v1,v2(0)〉
]
. (41)
Here, we assume that all the coefficients in (40) and (41) are bounded and deterministic functions
of t, ei1, · · · , ei6 are symmetric nonnegative definite, and ei7 is symmetric uniformly positive
definite. The set of admissible controls is defined by
Ui = {vi(·) | vi(·) is an R
ki-valued Et-adapted process
and satisfies E
∫ T
0
v2i (t)dt <∞}, i = 1, 2,
(42)
Where
Et = N ∨ σ
{
W (r) : 0 ≤ r ≤ t
}
.
For simplicity, we only deal with the case of 1-dimensional coefficients. Our problem is to find
(u1(·), u2(·)) ∈ U1 × U2, such that

J1(u1(·), u2(·)) = sup
v1(·)∈U1
J1(v1(·), u2(·)),
J2(u1(·), u2(·)) = sup
v2(·)∈U2
J2(u1(·), v2(·)).
(43)
Solving: We find the equilibrium point by three steps.
(i) Seek candidate equilibrium points.
Let q˜i(t) denote the filtering of qi(·) with respect to Et, i.e. q˜i(t) = E
(
qi(t)
∣∣Et). The similar
notations are made for ˜¯qi(t), p˜i(t), ˜¯pi(t), · · · , i = 1, 2.
Hi(t, y, z,Y, Z, v1, v2, pi, p¯i, qi, q¯i) , 〈qi, c0(t) + c1y + c2(t)Y + c3(t)Z〉+ 〈q¯i, d0(t)〉
− 〈pi, a0(t) + a1(t)Y + a2(t)Z + Fi2(t)v1 + a4(t)v2〉 − 〈p¯i, b0(t)〉
−
1
2
(
〈ei1(t)y, y〉+ 〈ei2(t)z, z〉 + 〈ei3(t)Y, Y 〉+ 〈ei4(t)Z,Z〉+ 〈ei7(t)vi, vi〉
)
. (44)
Applying the maximum principle for nonzero-sum games (Theorem 3.1), we confirm that the
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candidate equilibrium points must satisfy the following form:

u1(t) = −e
−1
17 (t)Fi2(t)p˜1(t),
u2(t) = −e
−1
27 (t)a4(t)p˜2(t),
(45)
where
(
pi(·), p¯i(·), qi(·), q¯i(·)
)
, for i = 1, 2, is the solution of the adjoint FBDSDE:


dpi(t) =
(
ei3(t)Y (t) + a1pi(t)− c2(t)qi(t)
)
dt
+
(
ei4(t)Z(t) + a2(t)pi(t)− c3(t)qi(t)
)
dW (t)− p¯i(t)dˆB(t),
−dqi(t) =
(
− ei1(t)y(t) + c1(t)qi(t)
)
dt−
(
ei2(t)z(t)
)
dˆB(t)− q¯i(t)dW (t),
pi(0) =ei6Y (0)−Mqi(0), qi(T ) = −ei5(T )y(T ),
(46)
and
(
y(·), z(·), Y (·), Z(·)
)
is the solution of the following equation:


−dY (t) =
[
a0(t) + a1(t)Y (t) + a2(t)Z(t)− Fi2(t)
2e−117 (t)p1(t)
− a4(t)
2e−127 (t)p2(t)
]
dt+ b0(t)dˆB(t)− Z(t)dW (t),
dy(t) =
[
c0(t) + c1(t)y(t) + c2(t)Y (t) + c3(t)Z(t)
]
dt+ d0(t)dW (t)− z(t)dˆB(t),
Y (T ) = ξ, y(o) = MY (0).
(47)
(ii) Optimal filtering with the sub-information Et = N ∨ σ
{
W (r); 0 ≤ r ≤ t
}
.
Equation (46) together with (47) constitutes a triple dimensional FBDSDE. In order to find
the explicit expression of the candidate equilibrium point, we need to compute the optimal filters
p˜1(·) and p˜2(·) of p1(·) and p1(·). Applying the filtering result derived by Xiong ([31], Lemma
5.4) to (46) and (47) under the available sub-information Et = N ∨ σ
{
W (r); 0 ≤ r ≤ t
}
, we
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conclude that p˜1(·) and p˜2(·) satisfy the following triple dimensional FBSDE:

−d


Y˜ (t)
q˜1(t)
q˜2(t)

 =




a1(t) 0 0
0 c1(t) 0
0 0 c1(t)




Y˜ (t)
q˜1(t)
q˜2(t)


+


0 −Fi2(t)
2e−117 (t) −a4(t)
2e−128 (t)
−e11(t) 0 0
−e21(t) 0 0




y˜(t)
p˜1(t)
p˜2(t)


+


a2(t) 0 0
0 0 0
0 0 0




Z˜(t)
˜¯q1(t)
˜¯q2(t)

+


a0(t)
0
0




dt−


Z˜(t)
˜¯q1(t)
˜¯q2(t)

 dW (t)
d


y˜(t)
p˜1(t)
p˜2(t)

 =




c2(t) 0 0
e13(t) −c2(t) 0
e23(t) 0 −c2(t)




Y˜ (t)
q˜1(t)
q˜2(t)


+


c1(t) 0 0
0 a1(t) 0
0 0 a1(t)




y˜(t)
p˜1(t)
p˜2(t)


+


c3(t) 0 0
0 0 0
0 0 0




Z˜(t)
˜¯q1(t)
˜¯q2(t)

+


c0(t)
0
0




dt
+




0 0 0
0 −c3(t) 0
0 0 −c3(t)




Y˜ (t)
q˜1(t)
q˜2(t)

+


0 0 0
e14(t) 0 0
e24(t) 0 0




Z˜(t)
˜¯q1(t)
˜¯q2(t)


+


0 0 0
0 a2(t) 0
0 0 a2(t)




y˜(t)
p˜1(t)
p˜2(t)

+


d0(t)
0
0




dW (t),


Y˜ (T )
q˜1(T )
q˜2(T )

 =


E[ξ|ET ]
−e15(T )y˜(T )
−e25(T )y˜(T )

 ,


y˜(0)
p˜1(0)
p˜2(0)

 =


M 0 0
e16(t) −M 0
e26(t) 0 −M




Y˜ (0)
q˜1(0)
q˜2(0)

 .
(48)24
Just like Huang et al.[6], we call (48) a forward-backward stochastic differential filtering equation,
which is distinguished from the classical filtering literature (see e.g. Liptser and Shiryaev[8],
Xiong[31]). Now, we obtain an explicit candidate equilibrium point for the foregoing LQ nonzero-
sum differential game.
(iii) Verify that
(
u1(·), u2(·)
)
denoted by (45) is indeed an equilibrium point.
We can check that the system (40) and performance criterion (41) satisfy the assumptions
(H1) and (H2), the Hamiltonian Hi (i = 1, 2) denoted by (44) satisfies the conditions (18–20).
Then, from Theorem 3.2, we conclude that
(
u1(·), u2(·)
)
denoted by (45) is indeed an equilibrium
point.
5 Conclusion
We are concerned with a new type of stochastic differential game problems of FBDSDEs. There
are two distinguishing features: One is that game systems are initial coupled; The other one
is that differential games is under partial information. We established a maximum principle
and a verification theorem, also called a necessary condition and a sufficient condition, for
an equilibrium point of partial information nonzero-sum stochastic differential games. Zero-
sum games can be considered as a particular case of nonzero-sum games, so we also gave the
corresponding conditions for a saddle point of zero-sum stochastic differential games. Finally,
we worked out an LQ example and gave the explicit expression of an equilibrium point of
nonzero-sum differential games.
It is worth pointing out that game system of FBDSDE covers many cases as its particular
case. If we drop its the terms of backward Itoˆ’s integral or forward equation or both them ,
FBDSDE can be reduced to FBSDE or BDSDE or BSDE. Moreover, if we suppose that Et = Ft
for all t ∈ [0, T ], all the results are reduced to the case of full information. In addition, stochastic
control problems can be regarded as zero-sum stochastic differential games with only one player.
Then, our results are a partial extension to Xiao and Wang[30] for optimal control of FBSDEs
with partial information, Han et al.[4] for optimal control of BDSDEs with full information,
Huang et al.[6] for optimal control of BSDEs with partial information, Wang and Yu[25] and
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Yu and Ji[34] for differential games of BSDEs with full information, and Wang and Yu[26] for
differential games of BSDEs with partial information. In our game systems of FBDSDEs with
partial information, the forward equations are coupled with the backward equations at initial
time, not terminal time. So they do not cover each other between our results and those of
terminal coupled forward-backward stochastic systems with full or partial information derived
by Buckdahn and Li[2], Hamade`ne[3], Hui and Xiao[7], Meng[11, 12], Øksendal and Sulem[14],
Peng and Wu[20], Shi and Wu[21, 22],Wang and Wu[23, 24], Wu[27, 28], Xiao and Wang[29],
Zhang and Shi[36], Zhu et al.[37].
Finally, since there are many partial information optimization and game problems in finance
and economics, we hope that the results have applications in these areas.
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